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Emotion recognition from facial expressions and words conveying emotions
is considered crucial for the development of interpersonal relations
(Pochon and Declercq, 2013). Although Down syndrome (DS) has received growing
attention in the last two decades, emotional development has remained underexplored,
perhaps because of the stereotype of high sociability in persons with DS. Yet recently,
there is some literature that is suggesting the existence of specific deficits in emotion
recognition in DS. The current study aimed to expand our knowledge on how
individuals with DS process emotion expressions from faces and words by adopting
a powerful methodological paradigm, namely priming. The purpose is to analyse to
what extent emotion recognition in DS can occur through different processes than in
typical development. Individuals with DS (N = 20) were matched to a control group
(N = 20) on vocabulary knowledge (PPTV) and non-verbal ability (Raven’s matrices).
Subsequently a priming paradigm was adopted: stimuli were photos of faces with
different facial expressions (happy, sad, neutral) and three words (happy, sad, neutral).
On a computer screen the first item (face or word) was presented for a very short
time (prime) and afterward a stimulus (face or word) appeared (target). Participants
had to recognize whether the target was an emotion (sad/happy) or not (neutral).
Four prime-target pairs were presented (face-word; word-face; word-word; face-word)
in two conditions: congruent (same emotion prime/target) and incongruent (different
emotion prime/target). The results failed to show evidence for differential processing
during emotion recognition between the two groups matched for verbal and non-verbal
abilities. Both groups showed a typical priming effect: In the incongruent condition,
slower reaction times were recorded, in particular when the target to be recognized is
the face, providing evidence that the stimuli were indeed processed. Overall, the data
of the current work seem to support the idea of similar developmental trajectories in
individuals with DS and TD of the same verbal and non-verbal level, at least as far
as the processing of simple visual and linguistic stimuli conveying basic emotions is
concerned. Results are interpreted in relation to recent finding on emotion recognition
from faces and words in DS.
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INTRODUCTION
Down syndrome (DS) is the most common genetic intellectual
disability and for this reason, for many years, DS has received
great attention from researchers. There are a large number of
studies concerning the cognitive and linguistic profile of DS,
which is extensively described for this population (Roizen and
Patterson, 2003; Abbeduto et al., 2007; Grieco et al., 2015;
McDuffie et al., 2017; Lanfranchi, 2019; Roch et al., 2019). Yet,
the socio-emotional profile of individuals with DS has remained
underexplored. The current study aims to expand our knowledge
of emotional skills in young adults with DS through the analysis
of the ability to recognize emotional expression and emotion
labels adopting a very powerful paradigm, namely, a priming
paradigm. This paradigm has never been used for investigating
emotion recognition in individuals with DS.
The ability to decode the facial expression of others is
considered crucial for the socioemotional competence and for
the construction of social interactions and relationships (Calder
et al., 2000; Wishart and Pitcairn, 2000; Izard et al., 2001;
Denham and Weissberg, 2004; Pochon and Declercq, 2014).
The identification of the socioemotional profile is therefore
essential in order to provide educational and psychological
support. One of the reasons for which this field has attracted
only limited research in the population with DS, is related to the
stereotype of high sociability in persons with DS (Pitcairn and
Wishart, 1994): in fact, they are generally considered proficient at
establishing social relationships with others. In addition, the first
studies that have investigated emotion competence in DS have
found that emotion recognition was in line with their level of
intellectual disability.
Turk and Cornish (1998) reported no differences between
children with DS and typically developing (TD) children,
matched for mental age, in the recognition of facial expressions of
happiness, sadness, anger, and fear, as well as in the recognition
of emotional vocalizations. Nevertheless, children with DS
performed worse than TD children in matching the appropriate
facial expression to the context: this result was interpreted as
an indication of an impairment in attributing the deep meaning
to the emotion. Similarly, Celani et al. (1999) compared the
performance of children with DS and TD matched for verbal
mental age at an emotion matching task. Children with DS
presented similar abilities to the TD children in recognizing
the expressions of happiness and sadness but also in rating the
valence of emotional expressions and situations, but showed a
specific difficulty in identifying anger. Following from this, it was
suggested that there might be qualitative differences in socio-
emotional functioning between individuals with DS and TD
children of the same cognitive level (Cebula and Wishart, 2008;
Cebula et al., 2010). Some of these deficits have been, indeed,
identified in infancy and childhood and this could have had a
negative impact on the subsequent development of interpersonal
relationships. It is relevant to adopt a developmental perspective
when examining individuals with atypical development, being
aware that what we observe in one moment is a result of a
developmental process that have had cascading effects on this
result (Ewing et al., 2017).
Some recent studies have found emotional difficulties in
children and adolescents with DS (Fidler et al., 2008; Jahromi
et al., 2008; Martinez-Castilla et al., 2015; Goldman et al.,
2017). These works noted weaknesses in emotion recognition
of individuals with DS which cannot be explained by their
level of cognitive ability (Wishart and Pitcairn, 2000; Williams
et al., 2005; Wishart et al., 2007; Cebula et al., 2017). Wishart
and Pitcairn (2000) compared a group of individuals with
DS to two control groups matched for the level of cognitive
ability: one group was composed by children with typical
development and the other was composed by individuals with
non-specified intellectual disability (ID). Children with DS
performed significantly worse when compared to the TD group
on a facial expression matching task involving six primary
emotions (happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, anger, and disgust);
they had particular difficulty in distinguishing fear and surprise.
The results of the children with non-specified ID were not
different from those of the TD children. Therefore, the impaired
performance of DS individuals in this task cannot be attributed
to intellectual disability and was, instead attributed to specific
features of DS. In line with this interpretation, Williams et al.
(2005) hypothesized that there might be a specific impairment of
emotion recognition in DS.
Several studies noted that the difficulty that individuals with
DS experience regarding the recognition of facial expressions was
not generalized to all emotions but was particularly evident for
specific emotions, namely, fear (see also Wishart et al., 2007).
More generally, Porter et al. (2007) showed that individuals
with DS show difficulties in recognizing negative emotions. In
addition, Kasari et al. (2001) highlighted that children with DS
tend to choose positive expressions instead of negative ones
and vice versa. Finally, other atypical errors were highlighted by
Williams et al. (2005) and Wishart et al. (2007): they reported that
children with DS tended to confuse fear with sadness.
The studies presented in this literature review all adopted
methods which minimized the use of language which is
controlled for through statystical approaches, for the sake of
the linguistic level of participants with DS. Nevertheless, the
instructions always involved the understanding of emotional
labels. This might have an impact on the performance of
individuals with DS because of the influence of emotional
language on the emotion perception (Lindquist et al., 2006;
Barrett et al., 2007). In this respect, Channell et al. (2014)
examined emotion recognition of a group of children and
adolescents with DS through tasks that measured the ability
to recognize others’ emotions from static and dynamic facial
expressions and from the social context and compared to typically
developing (TD) children of similar developmental levels. In
this study, a measure of emotion recognition that minimized
the need for linguistic skills was used. The results indicated
similar accuracy for participants with DS and TD participants
when judging emotions from static or dynamic expression
stimuli and from facial or contextual cues. In a further study,
the authors compared the two groups on the rate at which
their emotion recognition grew relative to their cognitive level,
and EXAMINED the relationship between emotion recognition
and developmental factors (mental and chronological age). The
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results indicated that participants with DS and TD showed
similar cross-sectional developmental trajectories of emotion
recognition in relation to their mental age and that emotion
recognition was correlated to both mental and chronological age
in each of the two groups. These two studies showed clearly that,
when the use of language skills is reduced in emotion recognition
tasks, DS individuals do not differ from TD children in emotion
recognition supporting the idea of similarity between groups in
this skill relative to the level of cognitive development.
Other recent studies used non-verbal tasks for the analysis
of emotion recognition in DS. Pochon and Declercq (2013)
conducted a longitudinal study using a non-verbal task for
emotion recognition. Children with DS were compared to a
group of children with non-specified intellectual disability and
TD children matched for non-verbal cognitive ability. The three
groups performed a task that required the recognition of six
basic emotions: they were asked to match an emotional auditory
stimulus (a vocalization) with an emotional visual stimulus (a
facial expression). The results revealed similar performance in
emotion recognition of the DS group compared to the other
two groups of participants. Because of the strictly non-verbal
design of this study, this result was interpreted as an indication
of possible negative influence of the emotional lexicon when
participants show impaired recognition of emotion expressions
(Pochon and Declercq, 2013). The results of this study were
replicated in a subsequent work with the same participants: the
ability to recognize basic emotional facial expressions by means
of a non-verbal protocol that uses video clips rather than static
photographs was adopted (Pochon and Declercq, 2014). Finally,
in a recent study, Pochon et al. (2017), reported new evidence
on the absence of differences in emotion recognition between DS
and TD matched for non-verbal ability. The authors conclude by
highlighting the importance of using dynamic, strictly non-verbal
tasks for participants with DS, and more generally for populations
with language disorders.
These four studies are the only recent studies in which children
with DS did not show weakness in recognizing emotions from
facial expressions; nevertheless, they have raised the question
of whether the difficulties reported for DS children in previous
studies were at least in part due to the use of emotional
labels. Notably, individuals with DS are characterized by severe
language impairments and emotional lexicon was repeatedly
mentioned as one of the weaknesses of their linguistic profile
(Chapman, 1997; Chapman and Hesketh, 2000). It is possible
then, that even when language level is controlled for, a deficit in
emotional vocabulary may disadvantage individuals with DS in
emotion recognition tasks. This interpretation would be coherent
with some observations that children with Down syndrome
are exposed to less conversation about emotional terminology
than typically developing children are. Since children with DS
tend to be perceived stereotypically as friendly and happy, their
caregivers tend to use fewer negative emotion words with them,
providing children with reduced opportunities to learn emotions
and to match correctly the emotion labels to specific emotions
(Tingley et al., 1994; Kasari et al., 2001).
The purpose, therefore, becomes to investigate more deeply
the nature of the deficits in emotion recognition of individuals
with DS in order to be able to better interpret the results obtained
in previous studies.
Most of the literature review reported in the previous
paragraphs have involved children and adolescents with DS
in their works. However, there are some studies of emotion
recognition in adults with DS (Porter and Coltheart, 2006;
Hippolyte et al., 2008, 2009; Carvajal et al., 2012; Virji-Babul et al.,
2012). For the purposes of the current work, the most relevant
data come from the study of Carvajal et al. (2012), in which
they showed that adults with DS did not present any specific
deficits in matching emotional significance to faces compared to
people with general intellectual disability. However, they found
that people with DS showed some specific deficits in the first
phases of the processing of faces, namely in configuring facial
traits. This calls for further research of the first phases in the
processing of the faces preceding emotion recognition.
We adopted a specific approach in order to investigate
emotion recognition and, in addition, we measured emotion
recognition by adopting an implicit recognition approach,
namely a priming paradigm in which we minimized the use of
emotion labels.
In priming experiments, participants are usually presented
with pairs of items displaced in time, a single prime word
presented for several milliseconds followed by a single target
word. Participants are required to make a response to the
target (e.g., naming the target aloud). Priming is measured
by comparing response time and accuracy across related and
unrelated trials. Numerous studies have shown that processing
of the target can be greatly influenced by the nature of the
relationship between the prime and target stimuli. Target stimuli
are typically associated with faster response times (RTs) and
fewer errors when they follow an identity (e.g., dog-dog) or
semantically (e.g., cat-dog) related prime relative to when they
follow a semantically unrelated (e.g., table-dog) stimulus (Neely,
1991, 1997; McNamara, 1992; Masson, 1995; Pesciarelli et al.,
2007). Priming is obtained when response times are faster and/or
accuracies are greater for related trials, relative to unrelated trials.
The priming effect is remarkably robust and has been observed
within a wide variety of experimental settings (see Neely, 1991 for
a review). Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain this
effect. One which is widely accepted is the automatic spreading
activation mechanism. It has been argued that faster response
times to related targets are the result of the target already being
partially activated by spreading activation from its related prime
occurring before target presentation (Neely, 1997).
The priming procedure is increasingly being used as a tool
to investigate cognitive mechanisms underlying language,
perception, memory, attention and emotion processing.
Therefore, this paradigm is well suited to investigate the ability
of individuals with Down syndrome to recognize whether a
face/label corresponds to an emotion or not.
The existing literature reports evidence on a possible specific
impairment of emotion recognition in individuals with DS. At
the same time, some studies pointed out that this impairment
might reflect a difficulty with emotion labeling that influence the
perception and the recognition of emotions and facial expressions
(Vicari et al., 2000; Lindquist and Gendron, 2013). The aim of our
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study is to contribute to a better understanding of the processes
involved in the recognition of emotional facial expressions by
individuals with DS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study that adopted a priming task in order to investigate emotion
recognition by individuals with DS. They were compared to
a group of typically developing first graders matched for
verbal and non-verbal skills. The two groups were required to
recognize emotion from facial expressions (photographs) and
from emotion labels (written words) through a priming paradigm
by distinguishing emotional states from neutral ones. The current
work is exploratory rather than confirmatory in nature since, to
the best of our knowledge, it is the first time a similar paradigm
is adopted for investigating emotion recognition in DS. For
this reason, it is not possible to formulate specific predictions
regarding the performance of the participants. Nonetheless, the
study was designed in order to address four issues for which there
is still an open debate in literature on emotion recognition in DS.
In particular, the current study was designed:
– To analyse group differences in the ability to distinguish
emotions from neutral states.
– To analyse whether the three emotion categories (sad,
happy and neutral) are processed differently.
– To analyse whether emotion recognition differs when the
emotions have to be identified through words or faces.
– To analyse whether the typical congruency effect expected
in the priming paradigm is more pronounced in
specific conditions, for specific targets and differs
across the two groups.
– Both the accuracy and the reaction times were analyzed
through the analyses of variance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants consisted of 20 individuals with DS (6 female;
chronological mean age = 23 years 3 months, age range = 17–37,
SD = 2 years 5 months) and 20 children with typical development
(TD) (10 female; chronological mean age = 6 years 5 months,
age range = 6–7 years, SD = 2 months). Italian was the native
language of all participants. All participants were residents in the
province of Padova, Veneto (Italy). Participants with DS came
from the Association Down DADI Padova. All of them were able
to read. Families and practitioners reported that none of the study
participants had symptoms of cognitive decline at the time of
the study. All participants with DS are active in the community,
they are either attending autonomy courses, working or attending
school: these data help us to support the idea that the results we
obtain in this work cannot have been influenced by a possible
symptomatology of cognitive or memory decline.
The sample of TD were selected from a larger group of 65
participants and were selected on the basis of the following
criteria: they were all first graders (they have had to be able to
read single words) and were matched to participants with DS on
the basis of their score on PPVT (Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test, Dunn and Dunn, 1981; Stella et al., 2000) and on the basis
of non-verbal intelligence scales (Coloured Progressive Matrices
CPM: Italian version – Belacchi et al., 2008). This allowed
us to have a double matching, both on verbal ability (verbal
matching = raw score -/+ 5 points) and non-verbal ability (non-
verbal matching = raw score -/+ 3 points). Individuals with DS
scored on average 96.95 (SD = 22.04) at the PPVT, while TD
children scored on average 95.05 (SD = 16.40). The two groups
scored at the non-verbal task 14.60 (SD = 3.55) for individuals
with DS and 18.55 (SD = 4.20) for TD children. The two groups
did not differ either on the measure of PPVT and on CPM [t
(19) = 0.987, p = 0.496 and t (19) = 1.2, p = 0.193, respectively
for PPVT and CPM].
Stimuli
Three color pictures of real faces (sad, happy, neutral) selected
from the NimStim face stimulus set (Tottenham et al., 2009)1
and three black letter words (triste-sad, felice-happy, neutro-
neutral) were used. The background was white and the mean
luminance was approximately the same for all pictures. The
prime and the target were either a word or a picture of
a real face. Four types of prime-target presentation pairs
were used: 1. word-face; 2. word-word; 3. face-face; 4. face-
word. The pairs of stimuli (prime-target) in each of the
four different presentation types belonged, in half of the
trials, to the same emotion (congruent condition) and, in
the other half to different emotions (incongruent condition)
(see Figure 1). In order to avoid orthographic overlap, prime
words were presented in lowercase letters and target words
in uppercase letters (Courier font, size 20). Prime faces were
25% smaller (visual angle 8.5◦) than target faces (visual angle
11.3◦) to avoid any apparent movement between the prime
and target stimuli.
Participants performed four blocks of 80 trials each (one word-
face; one word-word; one face-face; one face-word) in a total
of 320 trials. In each block, the emotion and the prime-target
congruency were fully crossed and counterbalanced.
Design and Procedure
The stimulus presentation procedure is graphically reported in
Figure 2. All stimuli (faces and words) were displayed in the
center of a CRT monitor synchronous with the screen refresh
[refresh rate = 60 Hz (16.67 ms)] that was positioned at eye
level approximately 70 cm in front of the participant. E-Prime
software (Version 1; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA)
was used for stimulus presentation and behavioral response
collection. Each trial began with a 1000 ms fixation cross (+)
presented in the middle of the screen. Then a white screen was
displayed for 200 ms and replaced by a 800 prime stimulus.
The prime was then immediately followed by a 400 ms white
screen. Then the target appeared and remained on the screen
until a response was made. Each response was followed by a
500 ms white screen. The task of the participants was to decide, as
quickly and accurately as possible, whether the target represented
an emotion or a neutral stimulus. Participants responded by
1The faces reported in Figures 1, 2 are not the ones used in the experiment. We
chose the image for which a written consent for publication was provided.
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FIGURE 1 | Research design: experimental stimuli.
pressing one of two buttons, which were counterbalanced (left
and right) across subjects. The participant’s responses controlled
the onset and termination of the target on the screen. When
the participant pressed one of the response buttons, the stimulus
was erased from the screen. Before the experiment, participants
took part in a short training session with 12 prime-target pairs
(3 for each presentation type). Further, they were asked to read
the three words (sad, happy and neutral) and to recognize the
three faces. All participants were able to label the three words
and the three facial expressions correctly. The task and the
procedure were specifically developed for this work therefore,
we will provide preliminary data on adopting the priming
paradigm in DS, and future works should be designed with a
similar procedure in order to provide for additional validation
of this paradigm.
Statistical Analysis
The original dataset consisted of 12800 observations (i.e., 40
subjects× 360 observations) on each of our dependent variables:
Accuracy and Reaction Time.
Given the type of experiment, to exclude unreliable
observations, we first eliminated all observations with Response
Time below 200 ms (i.e., anticipatory responses) and above
3500 ms (i.e., late responses). Specifically, 52 observations with
Reaction Time below 200 ms (0.04%) and 708 with Reaction
Time above 3500 ms (5.5%) were excluded. It is important
to note that the percentage of excluded observations were
homogeneous among Down (i.e., 5.61%) and Control (6.27%)
groups. Thus, the final dataset for the analysis of Accuracy
consisted of 12040 observations.
The analyses on Reaction Times (RTs) were carried out only
on trials with correct responses (n = 470, 3.4% rejected trials),
resulting in a dataset of 11570 observations (i.e., 90% of the
original number of observations).
Also in this case, the percentage of wrong answers was
homogeneous among Down (3.2%) and Control (4.6%) groups.
Logarithmic transformations were applied to correct for
positively skewed distributions of accuracy and reaction time
scores. All analyses were conducted both with transformed
and untransformed values. Because results did not differ,
untransformed values are reported for ease of interpretation.
Detailed descriptive statistics of Accuracy and Reaction
Times as a function of independent variables are presented in
Tables 1, 2. The mean RTs of correct responses and the accuracy
proportions were submitted to analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
with Prime-Target Congruency (congruent, incongruent),
Presentation Type (face-face, face-word, word-face, word-word),
Emotion (sad, happy, neutral), as within-subject factors and
Group (DS, TD) as between-subject factor. In addition, in
order to investigate the interaction between the priming effect
and emotional valences more deeply the mean RTs of correct
responses and the accuracy proportions were submitted to
ANOVAs with Presentation Type (face-face, face-word, word-
face, word-word), Prime Emotion (sad, happy, neutral), and
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental procedure.
Target Emotion (sad, happy, neutral) as within-subject factors
and Group (DS, TD) as between-subject factor.
When appropriate, degrees of freedom were adjusted
according to the method of Greenhouse-Geisser; only corrected
significance levels are reported. The level of significance testing
was p = 0.05. As post hoc mean comparisons (Bonferroni) were
employed to further examine significant effects (using a p < 0.05
criterion for significance).
RESULTS
All participants, both with TD and DS did not show any problem
performing the priming task and everyone appeared to have
understood the instructions.
Accuracy
For the sake of transparency, in Table 1 descriptive statistics
of Accuracy (Mean = 0.96, SE = 0.03) by levels of Group,
Congruency, Presentation Type and Emotion are shown.
Overall, all participants resulted accurate with an average
accuracy well over.85.
The ANOVA conducted on the accuracy data yielded a
significant main effect of Congruency [F(1, 38) = 9.52, p < 0.01,
ηp2 = 0.20], indicating that participants showed higher accuracy
in the congruent condition (Mean = 0.965, SE = 0.006) compared
to the incongruent condition (Mean = 0.947, SE = 0.006).
However, congruency does not interact with any main factor.
On the other hand, a statistically significant interaction between
Presentation Type and Emotion was found [F(2.83, 107.44) = 5.6,
p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.13; see Figure 3]. Post hoc analyses revealed
that there are no differences in the accuracy of the recognition
of the happy and neutral emotion across all the four conditions:
for both, participants resulted highly accurate across all the
conditions. The sadness was recognized with less accuracy in all
the conditions except in the face-word one, in particular when the
target is the face (regardless of the prime) and in the condition
word-word (all ps < 0.01). No difficulties were observed in the
accuracy of the recognition of the sad emotion in the face-word
condition. The second ANOVA, conducted in order to provide
a more in-depth investigation into the interaction between the
priming effect and emotional valences, did yield a marginally
significant Prime Emotion× Target Emotion interaction [F(2,56,
97.21) = 2.5, p < 0.07, ηp2 = 0.06]. Post hoc analyses revealed
a priming effect for all three emotions: grater target accuracy
when Prime and Target stimuli shared the same emotion (e.g.,
sad-sad) than when shared different emotions (e.g., happy-sad;
neutral-sad) (all ps < 0.01).
Reaction Times
In Table 2 descriptive statistics of Reaction Times
(Median = 1161.5, Mean = 1307.4, SE = 49.01) by levels of
Group, Congruency, Presentation Type and Emotion are shown.
The ANOVA conducted on reaction times showed a
significant main effect of Congruency [F(1, 38) = 22.86, p< 0.001,
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics: Mean proportions of accuracy and standard
errors by Group, Prime-Target congruency, Presentation type and Emotion
(nsubjects = 40).
Group
Prime-target Presentation DS (n = 20) TD (n = 20)
congruency type Emotion Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
Congruent Sad 0.84 (0.08) 0.93 (0.06)
Face – face Happy 0.99 (0.02) 0.98 (0.03)
Neutral 0.97 (0.04) 0.96 (0.04)
Face – word Sad 0.98 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
Happy 0.97 (0.04) 0.98 (0.03)
Neutral 0.98 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
Word – face Sad 0.92 (0.06) 0.94 (0.05)
Happy 0.98 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
Neutral 0.99 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
Word – word Sad 0.96 (0.04) 0.97 (0.04)
Happy 0.96 (0.04) 0.97 (0.04)
Neutral 0.98 (0.03) 0.99 (0.03)
Incongruent Face – face Sad 0.81 (0.09) 0.90 (0.07)
Happy 0.94 (0.05) 0.99 (0.02)
Neutral 0.94 (0.05) 0.95 (0.05)
Face – word Sad 0.99 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
Happy 0.97 (0.04) 0.96 (0.04)
Neutral 0.97 (0.04) 0.96 (0.05)
Word – face Sad 0.86 (0.08) 0.93 (0.06)
Happy 0.97 (0.04) 0.98 (0.03)
Neutral 0.92 (0.06) 0.97 (0.04)
Word – word Sad 0.90 (0.07) 0.93 (0.06)
Happy 0.96 (0.04) 0.98 (0.03)
Neutral 0.98 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
ηp2 = 0.38], indicating that participants showed faster RTs in the
congruent condition (Mean = 1301, SE = 48.54) compared to
the incongruent condition (Mean = 1365, SE = 48.54). However,
congruency does not interact with any main factor. We also found
a significant Group × Emotion interaction [F(1.9, 72.32) = 7.18,
p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.16; see Figure 4], suggesting that individuals
with DS are faster than TD children in the recognition of neutral
and sadness emotions; the difference between the two groups
appear higher for the sadness. Also, in each of the two groups
there are differences in reaction times during the recognition
of the three emotions: TD children differ in the recognition
of all the three categories with slower reaction times for the
sadness emotion and faster for the happy emotion; individuals
with DS are significantly slower in identifying sadness compared
to neutral and happy emotions, but do not show different reaction
times in the recognition of the happy and neutral category (all
ps < 0.01). Moreover, we found a Presentation Type × Emotion
interaction [F(4.73, 179.61) = 9.49, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.20; see
Figure 5]. Post hoc analyses revealed that participants are slower
in identifying the sadness and the neutral category than the happy
one. The recognition of both sadness and neutral categories is
slower when they have to identify the emotion through faces,
regardless of the prime. The results found that the reaction
times for the recognition of the happy emotion were the fastest
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics: Median and mean reaction times (ms) and
standard errors by Group, Prime-Target congruency, Presentation type and
Emotion (nsubjects = 40).
Group
Prime-target Presentation DS (n = 20) TD (n = 20)
congruency type Emotion Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
Congruent Sad 1318 (94) 1592 (91)
Face – face Happy 1133 (90) 1235 (58)
Neutral 1227 (77) 1478 (73)
Face – word Sad 1115 (110) 1507 (105)
Happy 1077 (68) 1318 (94)
Neutral 1084 (81) 1317 (97)
Word – face Sad 1273 (107) 1555 (88)
Happy 1149 (104) 1222 (66)
Neutral 1199 (93) 1414 (73)
Word – word Sad 1228 (92) 1605 (97)
Happy 1285 (101) 1431 (85)
Neutral 1124 (80) 1332 (76)
Incongruent Face – face Sad 1430 (101) 1674 (88)
Happy 1151 (62) 1321 (64)
Neutral 1297 (91) 1531 (77)
Face – word Sad 1119 (95) 1526 (126)
Happy 1188 (81) 1388 (108)
Neutral 1104 (84) 1318 (93)
Word – face Sad 1465 (125) 1616 (82)
Happy 1246 (99) 1293 (75)
Neutral 1311 (98) 1540 (91)
Word – word Sad 1281 (92) 1693 (86)
Happy 1266 (108) 1470 (92)
Neutral 1136 (86) 1405 (84)
and did not differ across the presentation type (all ps < 0.01).
Interestingly, the second ANOVA, conducted in order to more
deeply investigate the interaction between the priming effect and
emotional valences, yielded a significant Prime Emotion× Target
Emotion interaction [F(3.1, 117.62) = 4.46, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.11].
Post hoc analyses revealed a priming effect for all three emotions:
thus faster target RTs when Prime Emotion and Target Emotion
stimuli shared the same emotion (e.g., sad-sad) than when
they represented different emotions (e.g., happy-sad; neutral-sad)
(all ps < 0.01).
DISCUSSION
The current study was aimed to analyse the ability of adults
with DS to identify two basic emotions, namely happiness and
sadness in relation to neutrality, either through faces or written
words. Individuals with DS were compared to a group of TD
children matched for both verbal and non-verbal skills. The
research design adopted a priming paradigm, which, to the
best of our knowledge was adopted for the first time within
this field. For this reason, the current work is preliminary in
nature: predictions were not formulated due to an absence of any
theoretical account to which to refer to; the results are interpreted
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FIGURE 3 | Estimated mean proportions of Accuracy by Presentation Type and Emotion. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
FIGURE 4 | Estimated means of Reaction Time by Group and Emotion. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
as a starting point on which to build our future knowledge
regarding the processes underlying emotion processing in DS
through a priming paradigm. Nonetheless, the current findings
are discussed in relation to the literature concerning emotion
recognition and processing in DS in which different experimental
and testing paradigms were adopted. The current work provides
a contribution in building knowledge on emotion identification
in DS, a field which is still open to debate; what is still missing is
a clear indication of whether individuals with DS have a specific
impairment in emotion recognition or alternatively whether their
ability to identify emotions is in line with their cognitive and
linguistic level.
The advantage of priming, with respect to other paradigms,
is that it allows an investigation into the effect of a particular
prime-target relationship without participants’ awareness of the
manipulation, such that they cannot develop response strategies.
In this case the relation concerned the early identification of an
emotion and the distinction of this from neutrality, both through
a face expression or a written word. This allowed us to investigate
both the ability of participants to distinguish between emotions
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FIGURE 5 | Estimated means of Reaction Time by Presentation Type and Emotion. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
and neutral conditions and between their ability to identify the
target through face and word processing. Another advantage of a
priming paradigm is that both accuracy and speed of processing
are coded and analyzed.
The findings on accuracy indicated that, in general,
participants of both groups reported high accuracy in their
answers suggesting that the task was understandable and
appropriate for both groups. More importantly for the priming
paradigm, the congruency effect emerged significant indicating
that participants were less accurate in the incongruent condition
than in the congruent one: this result suggests that the priming
is effective and the task is appropriate. However, congruency
did not interact with other factors as far as accuracy is
concerned. Moreover, we failed to find effects of group (both
the main effect and the interactions are not significant) in
the accuracy during the participant’s performance: perhaps
this indicated that the task difficulty is similar for the two
groups when matched for verbal and non-verbal skills. As
far as the interactions are concerned, a significant interaction
between presentation type and emotion emerged. The sadness
was identified with less accuracy in all of the conditions
except in the condition face-word. Finally, no differences
emerged between the identification of the happy and neutral
one: for both, participants resulted highly accurate across all
the presentation types. A further analysis investigated the
interaction between the prime and the target emotion effect: a
significant interaction showed that participants of both groups
were more accurate in target recognition when prime and
target shared the same emotion than when they represented
different emotions.
In a priming paradigm, alongside the accuracy of the
performance, much more informative is the speed of the
performance, since it reveals the underlying processes during
the performance. The significance of the main effects is
relevant for providing validity to the paradigm: since this
is the first time that such a paradigm is adopted in this
population and with this material, the main effects are
discussed for their preliminary indication of validity. In
particular, the main effect of group and congruency provide
an indication that the paradigm is appropriate for the
target group. Participants provide faster responses in the
congruent than in the incongruent condition indicating a
priming effect. Individuals with DS resulted generally faster
than TD children. Interestingly the two groups do not
differ in accuracy.
Furthermore, the factor group interacts with the emotion
one. Individuals with DS are particularly fast with respect to
TD in the identification of sadness and the neutrality. The
two groups did not differ in the identification of happiness. If
we compare these results with the accuracy we can note that
participants are slow in recognizing the sadness (in particular
DS individuals) but at the same time they are less accurate
for this category.
Furthermore, the interaction emotion × presentation type
indicated that participants are slower when they have to
identify sadness in particular through faces. This is less
evident when the target is a word. Future studies will have
to explore more deeply this result and provide stronger
evidence suggesting that more time is needed for processing
a face than a word (with the same meaning). Our results
are preliminary in nature and future studies will have to
replicate the findings by addressing this specific hypothesis.
An interesting result emerged concerning the processing of
the happy emotion: the reaction times for the recognition
of this emotion are faster than for the other two categories,
and additionally, the speed of the recognition of the happy
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emotion does not differ across the four presentations. This
means, in other words, that the recognition of the happy
emotion is the easiest one, independently of the modality of
the presentation (face or word). Furthermore, an additional
analysis revealed a significant interaction between prime and
target emotion presentation: target RTs were faster when prime
and target shared the same emotion than when they represented
different emotions.
In the current study, although preliminary, we failed to
find specific difficulty in emotion identification for DS: they
tend to be faster than TD matched for verbal and non-
verbal skills and the two groups show similar levels of
accuracy. Other research studies have found evidence of
difficulties in emotional understanding in Down syndrome
(e.g., Kasari et al., 2001; Williams et al., 2005; Wishart
et al., 2007). Our findings that the identification of emotions,
both through faces and words, did not represent an area of
difficulty beyond what would be expected given their level
of verbal and non-verbal cognitive level, is very encouraging.
Indeed, except in specific conditions, the performance of
individuals with DS and of TD was overall marked more by
similarity than difference. This pattern is coherent with some
previous results (e.g., Pochon and Declercq, 2013; Channell
et al., 2014). The reasons for the discrepancy in findings
across different studies are still unclear, but are reasonably
related to differences concerning participants characteristics,
stimuli type and tasks.
In relation to specific emotions, we found some atypical
results for the processing of sadness. Previous literature reported
repeatedly difficulties in the processing of fear (e.g., also Wishart
et al., 2007). As previously discussed, for the first time, sadness
resulted to be processed, in specific circumstances differently
than the happy and the neutral categories, especially when the
target was a face. Namely, sadness is processed less accurately,
more slowly and with a larger priming effect. This result was
not different for the two groups. However, differences between
the groups were found concerning the speed of processing
of the three emotions: individuals with DS were faster than
TD in recognizing sadness. Previous works have suggested
that the differences between TD and DS can be attributed to
qualitative differences in the processing of emotions that may
be related to different life experiences with different emotions
(e.g., Cebula et al., 2010). In fact, it may be speculated that
TD children have less experience with sadness, in general,
than with happiness and neutral states given that they were
much younger. On the other hand, it is likely that individuals
with DS, who are young adults, have had more experience
with emotion recognition and in particular have had more
opportunities to encounter sadness during their life. Future
studies are needed in order to directly address this issue by
verifying the ability to recognize sadness in individuals with DS
of different ages.
Finally, our research design allowed us to compare
participants in the processing of the same stimuli conveyed
by faces and by words. It resulted that the two conditions in
which the face was the target were more difficult to process
than the two conditions with words as targets. This may be
related to more basic face processing difficulties highlighted for
individuals with DS.
In conclusion, this study provides some preliminary evidence
for the effectiveness of the adoption of a priming paradigm
with individuals with DS for the investigation of emotion
processing. Future studies will have to enhance our knowledge
of emotional competencies in children and adolescents with
DS by providing more concrete contribution to a better
understanding of the emotional competence of people with
DS. The present paradigm is very powerful for demonstrating
emotion recognition from very early stages of processing.
Future studies will have to investigate how these processes
relate to emotion knowledge in real-life interactions and
how these skills generalize across different social settings. In
fact, real-life emotion recognition is much more complex
than the controlled setting and selected stimuli presented in
the current work. Furthermore, further studies are needed
in order to analyze the extent to which individuals with
DS are able to use the knowledge on emotions in order
to regulate their behavior and language in function of this
awareness. Finally, besides investigating the recognition of basic
emotions (happy and sad), as in the current work, complex
emotions should be included in future studies. All of these
aspects are essential in order to better target educational
and psychological interventions targeting emotion knowledge
for people with DS.
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